Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth

A long-standing concern in political economy is whether outcomes are efficient in political equilibrium. Recent contributions have examined the efficiency/inefficiency of policy choices from a theoretical point of view. The aim of this paper is to examine such issue empirically. Building on existing "economic" diagnoses that highlight the deficient incentives present in Argentina’s Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement the paper will attempt to understand the politics behind its adoption and persistence. We suggest an explanation based on the transaction costs of Argentina’s political market. Although potentially Pareto-improving policies could have been adopted, they were not introduced because of the uncertainty over the future status of today’s bargains, and given the lack of institutions to enforce bargains among the political actors. The paper concludes offering some preliminary ideas for institutional engineering: what governance structures could help reduce these transaction costs? The purpose is to create an institutional framework in which political actors could negotiate among themselves, ensuring the enforceability of agreements, in order to achieve more efficient outcomes.

Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality

We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this super- majority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50 %) vote in accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high

The Political Economy of Productivity in Argentina: Interpretation and Illustration

This paper examines how the main characteristics of Argentina’s policymaking process (PMP) affect the productivity of its economy using the conceptual framework presented in Murillo, Scartascini and Tommasi (2008), Stein et al. (2008), Spiller and Tommasi (2007), and IDB (2005). First, the paper complements existing descriptions of the PMP by considering private agents and elaborating on structural characteristics possibly conducive to policymaking instability. Second, the paper illustrates the (negative) impact of Argentina’s lowquality and myopic PMP equilibrium on productivity by examining two key areas: provision of infrastructure services and agricultural policy. Finally, the paper explores the PMP at the local level of government (municipalities and local communities), finding that it mimics the flaws observed at the federal level.Political economy, Productivity, Argentina

Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de políticas en Paraguay, 1954-2003

(Documento disponible en idioma inglés) En este trabajo se describe la evolución del proceso de diseño de políticas de Paraguay (PMP, por sus siglas en inglés) entre 1954 y 2003. Se presenta una panorámica general del PMP durante el gobierno de Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) y se analiza el entorno institucional después de 1989. Se trata la manera en que el Partido Colorado se fue dividiendo progresivamente en varias facciones y se describen los patrones que caracterizan el proceso de diseño de políticas que surgieron tras la adopción de la Constitución de 1992. Se plantea la hipótesis de que la presencia de una gran cantidad de factores con poder de veto ha dificultado el proceso de cambio de políticas y que los legisladores parecen inclinarse por políticas particularistas. A fin de comprobar esas hipótesis empleamos una base de datos que contiene prácticamente todos los proyectos de ley presentados al Congreso desde abril de 1992. Las conclusiones sugieren que el PMP actual de Paraguay puede ser flexible en cuanto a la prestación de beneficios particularistas pero rígido en cuanto a la aprobación de políticas amplias de regulación o redistribución.

The Not-So-Popular Branch: Bicameralism as a Counter-Majoritarian Device

We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. The results highlight the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes. In equilibrium, the Senate imposes an endogenous supermajority rule on members of the House. We estimate this supermajority rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Moreover, our results indicate that the value of the information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that in equilibrium a large fraction of House members (40-50%) vote in accordance with their private information. Taken together, our results imply a highly conservative Senate, in the sense that proposals are enacted into law only when it is extremely likely that their quality is high

Veto Players, Fickle Institutions and Low-Quality Policies: The Policymaking Process in Ecuador

This paper seeks to understand why political actors, institutions and legal reforms have systematically failed to produce cooperation in the Ecuadorian policymaking process. From a comparative and historical standpoint, Ecuador has been trapped in a cycle of low-quality public policies that fail to adjust to environmental conditions, that fluctuate according to political whims and that tend to favor well-organized lobbies rather than pursuing optimal social outcomes. The paper identifies two alternative policymaking paths leading to poor policy outcomes. In the first one, the executive agenda is eclipsed by the short-term clientelistic demands of multiple veto players in the legislature, thus contributing to policy deadlock or rigidity. In the second, executive power is delegated to a decisive, often technical bureaucracy isolated from political pressures, but the lack of institutional stability of such bodies leads to a pattern of policy volatility. Lastly, the paper discusses the formal and informal roles of "last-ditch" veto players to stall or revert unwanted policies. The paper also features two case studies on fiscal and monetary policies, and derives empirical implications to improve the formation of durable intertemporal agreements in the legislature and ensure stable policy implementation and enforcement through a technical bureaucracy and independent judiciary.

An Analysis of California Pharmacy and Medical Students\u27 Dietary and Lifestyle Practices

Objective. To assess dietary and lifestyle practices of pharmacy and medical students in California and investigate whether they adhered to behaviors consistent with current dietary and exercise guidelines. Methods. The Block Brief 2000 Food Frequency Questionnaire and a supplemental survey assessing demographics, exercise, and dietary behaviors were administered to students across 10 California pharmacy and medical schools. Results. While the majority of students consumed sodium/day (73%) and dietary cholesterol/day (84%), only 50% had a saturated fat intake ≤10% total kcal, 13% met fiber intake goals, 10% consumed ≥8 servings/day of fruit and vegetables, and 41% exercised ≥150 minutes/week. The largest barrier to consuming a healthful diet was lack of time. Conclusion. A high proportion of pharmacy and medical students in California did not meet many of the dietary and physical activity recommendations. Health care programs may benefit from implementing nutrition and lifestyle education in their curriculum